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Abstract
We select six macroeconomic variables and study their relation with
(aggregate) net banking income. The aggregate net banking income was
reconstructed from US banking sector authorities' data. Usefulness may
be twofold, it provides aggregate insight and the methodology can be
replicated at bank institution level. We use standard tools such as linear
regression analysis (to study multicollinearity) and Granger causality. The
obtained results suggest a highly changing relation between all variables
in time and an increase of causality and feedback relations after the 2008
crisis.
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1 Introduction
An important condition for economic strength is a stable banking system. Key
factors for banking stability are capital, asset, funding and income structures
(Altunbas, Manganelli, & Marques-Ibanez, 2011). We will focus on some aspects
of one of these elements; income. Sources of determinants of banking income
are usually classiﬁed in two types. Macroeconomic, general of the economic
system; and idiosyncratic, particular to each institution. Numerical models test
macroeconomic dynamics impact on some quantitative economic-ﬁnancial mea-
surement1, in terms of position and evolution. The link between macroeconomic
variables (MV) and the speciﬁc bank institution is usually done via a satellite
model (Henry et al., 2013); which provides the connection between relevant MV
∗Buenos Aires University, Faculty of Economic Science, e-mail mszybisz@hotmail.com
1Typically balance sheet or income statement.
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and the key bank indicator (usually a risk measure). In this framework, the
explanatory power of each variable is relevant to individual institutions as de-
terminant of their results (Hughes & Poi, 2015) since they provide information
on what factors banking income depend.
Some constrains of this work may provide a stricter delimitation of the scope.
We do not use explicit macro and satellite models, but preserve the structural
relation between macro and micro (bank level) variables. Hence, consequences
of the relations for concrete capital calculation, risk measurement and stress
testing forms are out of the range of this work. Furthermore, we do not seek
a most representative mix of variables that explains or is useful to predict in
some optimal way 2. For concreteness, signiﬁcant variables are absent, notably
bank level variables or MV such as foreign exchange rates or the yield curve.
The aim is to analyse the form of structural long-term relations between the
MV and the bank sector situation expressed via it income. These bounds do
provide a simpler framework without loss of generality. In section 2 variables are
presented, section 3 discusses stationarity. Section 4 examines a linear regres-
sion of net banking income as dependent variable considering structural breaks,
heterocedasticity and multicollinearity. Section 5 build over the hints of section
4 analysing Granger causality between MV and its Granger causal relation with
banking net income afterwards. The ﬁnal part of section 5 studies the increase
of causality and feedback relations. Section 6 concludes3.
2 Election of variables
In this paper we want to describe the relation between banking income and some
MV using usual econometric tools. We use annual data for macroeconomic series
and net income of commercial banks of the United States4. Series have data
from 1959 for all variables, but as we use some diﬀerentiated data for regression
and analysis, the data frame employed covers from 1961 to 2017. The Federal
Reserve of St. Louis is the source for all macroeconomic series5. For banking
sector net income; we use Annual Reports of the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation until 19806 and the Annual Statistic Digest of the Federal Reserve
for the period 1981-19847. From 1985 onwards data is taken from the Federal
2Functional forms and simplicity.
3Complete results of Granger causal relations between variables are shown in appendix A.
4All econometric tests of this work are performed with Eviews 9 with a signiﬁcance level
of 5% when not indicated otherwise, the analysis of the results of section 5 have been realized
with Excel 2016.
5(U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis, 1959-2017, (accessed July 11, 2018)), (Board of Gover-
nors of the Federal Reserve System (US), 1959-2017, (accessed July 11, 2018)a), (U.S. Bureau
of Labor Statistics, 1959-2017, (accessed July 11, 2018)a), (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics,
1959-2017, (accessed July 11, 2018)b), (Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System
(US), 1959-2017, (accessed July 11, 2018)b), (Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, 1959-2017,
(accessed July 11, 2018)).
6(Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (U.S.), 1959-1980).
7(Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (U.S.), 1981-1984).
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Financial Institutions Examination Council Annual Reports8. Since 1985 until
2008 these reports have yearly data each calendar midyear; we take the semi-sum
of a year with the next one to obtain data for end December. Two advantages
result from using net income form all commercial banks; the analysis can be
done at aggregate sector level and be replicated at institution level and any
intermediate grouping. Next we present brieﬂy each variable.
Banking sector net income: Income is an indicator of the soundness of
bank ﬁnancial evolution and had been used to evaluate sensitiveness to adverse
macroeconomic scenarios (Coﬃnet, Lin, & Martin, 2009).
GNP: We use GNP (Gross National Product) following the Saint Louis
formulation, which is a standard measure used in empirical investigations (Hafer
et al., 1982). GNP is a suitable measure in this case because it includes income
regardless of whether it is earned by nationals within national borders or derived
from foreign source. Banking net income also incorporates income derived from
foreign sources.
M2: We adopt M2 as money quantity measure since commercial banks op-
erate with (deposits and some ﬁnancial instruments) M2 to generate income.
The statement that changes in the expansion of money quantity may be related
to changes in banking income is equivalent to assert, following Milton Friedman,
that the relevant variable is the deviation of anticipated growth rates of money
quantity (De Vroey, 2016).
We also work with nominal variables as a change in money quantity does
not necessarily derive in changes of prices or GNP. Changes of money velocity
(Wicksell, 1978) may also occur, especially due to the large period and ∆t we
use. If money demand is not stable and undergoes unpredictable shifts, velocity
cannot be forecasted and the quantity of money may not be tightly linked to
aggregate spending (income) (Galí & Gertler, 2007). In particular, technological
change in transactions (ﬁnancial innovations) aﬀects money velocity (Judd &
Scadding, 1982). Substitutes for money are regularly emerging which may have
an impact on velocity9; recently Lucas et al. incorporate money market deposit
accounts in his deﬁnition of money (Lucas Jr & Nicolini, 2015).
Inﬂation: Inﬂation measures accumulation of aggregate price changes; higher
(moderate) inﬂation may lower default rates of non-adjustable instruments10.
Unemployment: Unemployment rate is one of key MV determining net bank-
ing income; e.g. higher unemployment leads to higher default risk (Foglia, 2008).
Interest rate: We employ a short term interest rate. Hall uses this kind of
rate even for investment decision (Hall, Sims, Modigliani, & Brainard, 1977)
considering the argument that the diﬀerence of a long-term interest rate is re-
ﬂected in the short-term rate. This make possible to cover a broad market that
use diﬀerent interest rates.
Spread: The Moody's Seasoned Baa Corporate Bond Yield Relative to Yield
on 10-Year Treasury Constant Maturity Spread is employed because of the con-
8(Federal Financial Institution Examination Council (U.S.), 1985-2017).
9Agents may substitute instruments that have diﬀerent velocity than the new ones.
10Whereas high inﬂation may lead to the disappearance of long term loan markets (Heymann
& Leijonhufvud, 1995).
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nection of spreads to macroeconomics and ﬁnancial markets; e.g., as leading in-
dicator of investment and output declines (Gilchrist, Ortiz, & Zakrajsek, 2009).
For variables expressed as rate (other than inﬂation) we take an annual aver-
age over monthly data, as income of the interval (year) is inﬂuenced not just by
the ﬁrst or last (monthly) value of the involved variable. For variables quantiﬁed
in money units, we do not use logarithmic transformations since there are large
percentage changes involved and the Taylor approximation of the logarithmic
function does not perform with acceptable errors (Nielsen, 2008).
2.1 Graphs
Figure 1 shows the time evolution of selected variables, where dgnp is used for
the ﬁrst diﬀerence of annual GNP, ddm2 represent the annual second diﬀerence
of M2, inflar stays for annual inﬂation, tb3my is the annual average of the
annualized 3 mouth Treasury Bill rate, uratea is the annual average of the
unemployment rate, baa10yma is the annual average of the spread between a
10 year corporate bond and 10-year Treasure Constant Maturity; dnetincome
is the ﬁrst diﬀerence of annual aggregate net commercial banking income11.
(a) ﬁg 1 (b) ﬁg 2 (c) ﬁg 3
(d) ﬁg 4 (e) ﬁg 5 (f) ﬁg 6
(g) ﬁg 7
Figure 1: Selected macro variables and net income for commercial banks. Bil-
lions USS dollar for dgnp, ddm2, dnetincome; rate for others
11For variables, upper and lower case are used indistinctly in this paper.
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Variables dnetincome and dgnp are already ﬁrst diﬀerences, in order to reach
the stationarity of the variables which is discussed in section 3.
3 Stationarity
Tests of stationarity for all variables presented in subsection 2.1 have been real-
ized. In particular a test for unit root that allows a structural break was selected
for inflar and tb3my. Results are presented in table 1.
Table 1: Unit Root tests
Stationarity H0 : ∃ unit root
Variable Structural Break Linear Function with p-value
DDM2 no Intercept 0
BAA10YMA no Intercept 0.0032
URATEA no Intercept 0.0088
DGNP no Intercept and Trend 0.0004
INFLAR Break Speciﬁcation: Intercept and trend Intercept and Trend < 0.01
Break Type: Additive outlier
Break Date: 1982
TB3MY Break Speciﬁcation: Intercept and trend Intercept and Trend < 0.01
Break Type: Additive outlier
Break Date: 1980
DNETINCOME no Intercept 0.0122
Since the seminal work of Perron (Perron, 1989) the presence of structural
breaks and it relation to unit root testing has been an active ﬁeld of investiga-
tion (Perron, 2017). Casini et al. (Casini & Perron, 2018) provides an overview
of methods that are of direct usefulness in practice. In our case this test is
pertinent considering the rather long period involved and changes in the eco-
nomic structure that occurred along the way, such as the abandonment of the
gold standard in 1971, the ﬁnancial liberalization of the 1980s and the great
recession of 2008. For ddm2, baa10yma, ureatea, dgnp and dnetincome we use
a standard augmented Dickey-Fuller test. For inflar and tb3my we perform
an augmented Dickey-Fuller unit root test that allow a breaking point12. We
use additive outlier due to the shock nature of the regime changing policies.
Based on the results we detrended the ﬁrst diﬀerence of GNP naming it dgnpdt
and removed intercepts and trend for inﬂation and T-bill rate calling the new
variables inflarss and tb3myss respectively.
12Lag Length: 1, based on Schwarz information criterion. With minimized Dickey-Fuller
t-statistic which select the date providing the most evidence against the null hypothesis of a
unit root and in favour of the breaking trend alternative hypothesis.
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4 An equation
The considerations of section 2 and 3 lead to a functional formulation of the
form:
dnetincome = F (dgnpdt; ddm2; inflarss;uratea; baa10yma; tb3myss) (4.1)
Let us expose a possible explanation of the relation between the variables to get
insight of structural relations and links of the elements involved.
Broadly speaking banking income comes; ﬁrst, from the spread between the
interest rates that it receives on investments and those what it pays for resources.
Secondly, from the revaluation of on and oﬀ-balance sheet positions. Therefore,
banks income is aﬀected by credit risk (related to counterpart default) and
market risk (aﬀecting on and oﬀ-balance sheet positions prices).
Suppose that in normal times interest rates are more correlated with market
risk (TBill rates and spreads) as a change in interest rate aﬀects more the price
of long-term assets than short-term investments13.
On the other hand, unemployment rate and GNP are more closely corre-
lated with credit risk; lower GNP and higher unemployment tend to elevate
probability and exposure to default (Hughes & Poi, 2015).
Macroeconomic theory suggest that a greater quantity of money lowers credit
restrictions (Christiano & Eichenbaum, 1991). Moreover, an expansionary mon-
etary policy tends to boost asset prices14 and reduce market risk. Recently,
Quantitative Easing is an example of this kind of policy, which basically in-
volves central banks buying assets such as government securities (Japan) or
agency debt and agency mortgage backed securities (United States). The Eu-
ropean Central Bank develop this policy via Repo operations whose collateral
are, in a substantial part, bank loans and not government bonds (Joyce, Miles,
Scott, & Vayanos, 2012).
Moderate inﬂation rates tend to lower default rates. Asset prices (and there-
fore market risk) have been reported disconnected from inﬂation for periods
(high asset price volatility and low inﬂation) (Bernanke & Gertler, 2000) and
the Mundell-Tobin eﬀect has little practical impact for moderates inﬂation15
(Temple, 2000).
4.1 Structural break
The next step is to perform a regression of dnetincome as dependent variable
using ordinary last squares (OLS)16.
13A non-decreasing yield curve is a suﬃcient condition i.e., positive or null ﬁrst maturity
derivative in the relevant section of the curve.
14See (Mishkin, 2001) for various proposed mechanism.
15Higher capital purchases due to inﬂation boost by higher monetary growth rate that
depresses real interest rate, increasing capital accumulation and the natural level of output.
16C represents constant in tables 2 and 3.
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Table 2: Regression. Ordinary last squares. First data point: 1961 (both cases),
last data points 1980 and 2017 respectively
Dependent Variable:
DNETINCOME
Sample: 1961 1980 Sample: 1961 2017
Observations: 20 Observations: 57
Variable Coeﬃcient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. Coeﬃcient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C 0.64348 0.54516 1.180351 0.259 -14.28488 7.028658 -2.032377 0.0474
DGNPDT 0.007653 0.002502 3.058342 0.0092 0.057264 0.010326 5.545379 0
DDM2 0.001286 0.004886 0.263177 0.7965 0.029392 0.012127 2.423736 0.019
INFLARSS 17.78568 7.602974 2.339306 0.0359 148.295 122.5847 1.209734 0.2321
URATEA -8.252758 11.82566 -0.697869 0.4976 323.3011 119.7064 2.700785 0.0094
TB3MYSS 3.313522 10.61741 0.312084 0.7599 -36.22344 116.6908 -0.310423 0.7575
BAA10YMA 7.474284 18.6316 0.401162 0.6948 -412.0978 242.5506 -1.699018 0.0955
1980 2017 1980 2017
R-squared 0.727827 0.506078 Mean dependent var 0.600313 2.631531
Adjusted R-squared 0.602209 0.446808 S.D. dependent var 0.58071 16.05614
S.E. of regression 0.366258 11.94206 Durbin-Watson stat 1.444284 1.660305
Sum squared resid 1.743883 7130.641 Prob(F-statistic) 0.003954 0.000002
A proportion of near 0.45 of the path of banking income is explained by
the regression as the adjusted R2 for the period 1961-2017 in table 2 indicates.
That is consistent with the restrictions of section 1; in particular, that several
variables are absent of the analysis such as operational factors of institutions17
or banks dependencies on some economic sector18. The adjusted R2 of near 0.6
for the period 1961-1980 is a hint that the relation between variables changes
relevantly in time, being more stable for the reduced period 1961-1980.
The three tests performed (Chow, Quandt-Andrews and BaiPerron) give
2007 as a time of a structural break, all tests with a p-value close to 0. Due
to the presence of this structural break we include a slope changing dummy
variable of dgnp from 2007 onwards in the regression of table 3 as a way to
show the change of regime. The signiﬁcant gain of near 0.2 in adjusted R2 and
a p-value of 0 for the slope coeﬃcient of the dummy variable are indications
of the nature of the changes in the individual path of the variables and of the
changing nature of their relations.
4.2 Heterocedasticity
Due to the long period involved and possible changes in the volatility of the
variables we also perform a regression using White heterocedastic consistent
standard errors and covariance (WHC). Results are not substantially diﬀerent
of the obtained using OLS as seen in table 3 in terms of adjusted R2 and F-
statistics. The inclusion of the slope changing dummy of dgnp makes dgnpdt
in the OLS speciﬁcation not signiﬁcant with a p-value of 0.064. In the WHC
formulation the coeﬃcient of dgnpdt is signiﬁcant, with a p-value of 0.0272.
This instability reﬂects the issue that controlling for heterocedastic errors is rel-
17For instance management appetite for risk or exposure to fraud.
18Some institutions have a greater exposure to the housing loan market whereas others may
be more linked to ﬁnancing information technology.
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evant. More generally, the signiﬁcance-changes of the coeﬃcient of one variable
(dgnpdt) due to the introduction of another (slope changing dummy of dgnp) is
an indication of possible multicollinearity.
With the WHC method ddm2 and dgnpdt have a positive relation with
dnetincome. When GNP growth is positive then growth of banking net income
increases, when money quantity growth expands then growth of banking net
income increases. Both are expected results; banking net income take part of
economic growth and money quantity growth expansion per unit of time leads
to it intermediary to enlarge his income growth.
Table 3: Regression with dummy variable. OLS and WHC
Dependent Variable:
DNETINCOME
Observations: 57
OLS WHC
Variable Coeﬃcient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob. Coeﬃcient Std. Error t-Statistic Prob.
C -13.40643 5.558188 -2.412014 0.0197 -13.40643 9.208048 -1.455947 0.1518
DGNPDT 0.019992 0.010555 1.894061 0.0641 0.019992 0.008782 2.276582 0.0272
DDM2 0.039039 0.009741 4.007633 0.0002 0.039039 0.012271 3.18129 0.0025
INFLARSS 144.9833 96.9015 1.496192 0.141 144.9833 117.1481 1.237606 0.2218
URATEA 185.873 97.78868 1.900762 0.0632 185.873 156.2847 1.189323 0.24
TB3MYSS -120.1234 93.46263 -1.285256 0.2047 -120.1234 77.44155 -1.55115 0.1273
BAA10YMA 197.5502 220.7753 0.894802 0.3753 197.5502 186.8941 1.057016 0.2957
@YEAR>2006*DGNP -83.95068 15.07314 -5.569554 0 -83.95068 10.67095 -7.867213 0
OLS WHC OLS WHC WHC
R-squared 0.697548 0.697548 Mean dependent var 2.631531 2.631531 Wald F-statistic 1764.214
Adjusted R-squared 0.654341 0.654341 S.D. dependent var 16.05614 16.05614 Prob(Wald F-statistic) 0
S.E. of regression 9.439852 9.439852 Durbin-Watson stat 2.112305 2.112305
Sum squared resid 4366.429 4366.429 Prob(F-statistic) 0 0
4.3 Multicollinearity
Data users like monetary authority, ﬁnancial institutions and researchers need
to determine which variable19 drive the path of net banking income. For a
structural analysis of the relationship of each independent variable with the
depended one, multicollinearity brings an obstacle. In this case the standard
error of individual parameters do not allow to (statistically) determine the form
of the relationship.
The joint contribution of the MV is signiﬁcant as the null value of the F
statistic probability, the 2.11 of the Durbin Watson test and the 0.65 of adjusted
R2 indicates in table 3. Furthermore, except for ddm2 and dgnpdt, no signiﬁcant
(at 5 percent level) variable coeﬃcient are obtained in WHC case. At the same
time, the coeﬃcient of the variable uratea switch sign in table 2 which can
be seen as a further sign of the coeﬃcients instability. Our ﬁndings are in
accord with Kapinos et al. (Kapinos & Mitnik, 2016)20 which point collinearity
as a mayor issue in constructing top-down stress models and Papadopoulos
19In our case; money, GNP, inﬂation, unemployment, spread or interest rate (and the sign
of the relationship).
20Related to Comprehensive Capital Analysis and Review (CCAR).
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(Papadopoulos, Papadopoulos, & Sager, 2016) who point multicollinearity as a
mayor problem to develop satellite models for risk assessment.
Excluding some variables of the regression while retaining near the same
explanation power is a usual solution. But when the relation between variables
changes in time this may be no more a helpful technique (parameters are time
dependent). It is possible to argue that the dropped variables may develop his
inﬂuence via those that remains in the equation. Even so, eliminating variables
that do not have a statistically signiﬁcant coeﬃcient may lead to a missing
information problem that can present itself in several ways. We describe brieﬂy
some of them. First, variables may be statistically signiﬁcant depending on the
time frame. Inflarss in table 2 has a statistical signiﬁcant coeﬃcient depending
on the time frame used. We will explore this time changing feature in section
5. Second, variations in the variable left in the equation may be erroneously
attributed to changes in this variable and not to modiﬁcations in the excluded.
In our framework, that can be the case of uratea with dgnpdt where changes
of uratea or in the coeﬃcient of uratea can be misinterpreted as changes of
dgnpdt. Third, if the relation is of a feedback loop (mutual inﬂuence), or a
network of variables with feedback loops, dropping one of the variable involved
may involve missing relevant information over second round eﬀects (Committee
on the Global Financial System, 2005) and lead to an incomplete understanding
of the dynamics of the relations (convergent, oscillatory or divergent).
5 Granger causality
Feedback eﬀects between variables are relevant issues when modelling, in par-
ticular for bank stress testing (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, 2009).
To test for possible feedback loops we can use the Granger causality test and
see if both variables are Granger causing the other. Furthermore, the relation
between variables in such a long period may not be stable due to changes in:
the structural framework of economic policies (i.e. inﬂation before and after
1982), conditions of production21, proportion of production22 or crisis as the of
1987 or 2008. We have seen in section 4 that this is statistically the case in
the circumstance of the 2007-2008 crisis for equation 4.1. To account for such
changes, the analysis is performed using a rolling-window Granger-causality test
approach, based on a modiﬁed bootstrap estimation with a ﬁxed window size23
for various sample and lag sizes (Swanson, 1998).
The complete set of causal and feedback relation is exposed in appendix A24.
21Regulatory changes, information technology (velocity of transmission and digital trading).
22Variation of banking non-interest earnings from 1985 onwards (Hoshi & Kashyap, 1999).
23Starting at n=1961, using j data points and continuing with n+1, n+2..., j ﬁxed; see in
appendix A a complete explanation. Lag refers to the included in the Granger causality test.
24In this section we want to highlight a few relevant relations. Year in graphs is the last
year of each sample series. We identify periods with the last two digits of ﬁrst and last years.
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5.1 Granger causality: Macroeconomic variables
Next we use the example of ﬁgure 2 to analyse some features of the MV network.
(a) ﬁg 1 (b) ﬁg 2 (c) ﬁg 3
Figure 2: Unemployment Rate and Diﬀerence GNP (detrended), Sample series
size of 12 (1 lag, 46 series), 22 (2 lags, 36 series), 32 (3 lags, 26 series)
Variability: a feature that the relations between the MV show is that they
are not stable in the sense that their causality and feedback relation behave
within certain limits. In ﬁgure 2 for the relation between uratea and dgnpdt
we see, for diﬀerent lag, sample size, and series quantity25, diﬀerent regimes.
For one lag, dgnpdt causes almost everywhere uratea 26 whereas uratea causes
dgnpdt during the seventies and in 2007. The other two examples show a relative
stable causal relation from dgnpdt to uratea and feedback at the beginning of
the series, although the starting points for each series are diﬀerent, the 1980s
for 2 lags and the 1990s for 3 lags.
(a) ﬁg 1 (b) ﬁg 2 (c) ﬁg 3
(d) ﬁg 4 (e) ﬁg 5
Figure 3: Tbill rate (detrended), Unemployment Rate and Diﬀerence GNP
(detrended), Inﬂation (detrended) and Baa Spread (10y). Sample series size
of 15 (1 lag, 43 series)
25Due to the rolling windows approach.
26Maintained in the case of diﬀerent lag and sample size speciﬁcation. See appendix A
tables 4,5,6,7 for the complete estimations.
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Indirect causation: in ﬁgure 3 is shown that a network of feedback relations
can be established between variables27. From a connection perspective, inﬂuence
of one variable can go to another indirectly; those that do not have a direct
Granger causal link may be statistically connected via other variables.
Time lag: from a time perspective, causality and feedback eﬀects does not
need to appear at the same moment, therefore a variable can inﬂuence other
indirectly various lags later. In ﬁgure 3 we see that the feedback relation in 1999
between tb3myss and ddm2 may inﬂuence uratea in 00-01 because tb3myss has
a feedback relation with uratea at that time, but uratea inﬂuence of 00-01 may
not pass to ddm2 because tb3myss Granger cause ddm2 not until 2008. At the
same time it will be more diﬃcult to pass to the other variables the earlier 1970s
inﬂuence of ddm2 over tb3myss because of the time past until the mid 1990s.
Time density: during the earlier 1970s there is evidence of a network of
feedback loops between the variables of sub-ﬁgure 1, 2, 3 and 5 and dgnpdt
causing inflarss in sub-ﬁgure 4 (all of ﬁgure 3).
Time point connectivity: year 1999 seems to be an important date for in-
terrelations; baa10y causes dgnpdt, dgnpdt causes inflarss, and inflarss has
feedback relation with tb3myss, whereas tb3myss causes uratea and has feed-
back relation with ddm2.
Causality direction: uratea causes tb3myss in 1996, with feedback relations
of tb3myss with ddm2 and inflarss in 1999, inflarss causes dgnpdt in 02-03
and dgnpdt causes baa10y not until 2008.
The last two examples shows that this kind of analysis is useful to see causal-
ity direction.
Clustering: the feedback of inflarss and dgnpdt interact with the feedback
of dgnpdt and baa10y during 13-14, but it is no link available in these relations
that passes this cluster of relations to other variables. Crucial (at least in this
concrete variable network formulation) is the link of inflarss and tb3myss in
2007 to pass the inﬂuence to uratea and ddm2.
These examples show us that persistence is a critical condition for transmis-
sion, and that, the longer the separation between periods of Granger causality
the less probable that a transmission may occur.
Transmitter: In the network of ﬁgure 3 tb3mss occupies a transmitter posi-
tion, the link of inflarss to tb3mys is one that allows transmissions in the 2000s.
In the early 1970s the network of feedback connections is especially dense. One
other important fact is that the network structure is time dependent, connec-
tions are constantly changing.
27For all characteristics, we restrict our attention to the relations of the variables presented
in ﬁgure 3, for a complete network of relations see tables 5 and 6.
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Figure 4: Granger causality between second diﬀerence of Money and detrended
diﬀerence GNP, ﬁve lags
In ﬁgure 4 we see that one of the most studied relationships does not has
feedback relation until ﬁve lags, but as we have already seen the causation may
be transmitted via a chain network of other variables. Furthermore, this process
of "long memory" may be an indication that inﬂuence of one variable to another
may take some time to appear as suggested by numerous authors cited by Walsh
in the ﬁrst chapter (Walsh, 2017) for relations between interest rates, output
and inﬂation.
This long memory may be a relevant indirect transmission mechanism. Net
banking income may be aﬀected (indirectly) several periods later through an-
other variable even without any direct relationship.
5.2 Granger causality: Banking net income and macroe-
conomic variables
(a) ﬁg 1 (b) ﬁg 2 (c) ﬁg 3
(d) ﬁg 4 (e) ﬁg 5 (f) ﬁg 6
Figure 5: Granger causality one lag, series of 10
We see in ﬁgure 5 that the relations between MV and banking net income are
also highly volatile. In all of them the range of variation of the p − value
cover almost the entire possible spectrum. As seen in subsection 5.1, the longer
the separation between periods of Granger causality the less probable that a
12
transmission may occur. The network structure is time dependent; connections
are constantly changing. Numbers of lag are relevant (see tables 5 and 6) and
the (possibly changing) parameter value of each relation is also critical28.
(a) ﬁg 1 (b) ﬁg 2 (c) ﬁg 3
(d) ﬁg 4 (e) ﬁg 5
Figure 6: Granger causality between DDM2 and Dnetincome; 1 to 5 lags, series
of 12, 25, 30, 38 and 47 observations respectively
Figure 6 shows the most persistent feedback relation. It is only absent in 1
lag, 10 sample series size and 2 lag, 20 and 22 sample series size (see table 6). The
importance of this relation is that it can pass on all inﬂuence of the other MV
and also allows to transfer shocks of the banking sector to the macroeconomic
structure. This relation can be explained (given the sign in tables 2 and 3) as
that an increasing growth of money quantity tends to boost income of bank in
two ways; it contributes to less restrictive conditions in the credit market and
provides liquidity to the market which boost asset prices. Both tent to raise
banking income by elevating income from credits (more money is available to
lend; liquidity eﬀect) and higher asset prices giving the higher liquidity.
5.3 Granger causality: Evidence of increased relations
The data shows that an increase in feedback relations can not be rejected at ﬁve
percent level of signiﬁcance when the last data points of the series are situated
around 2008.
28Not treated in this work, in general the greater this parameter the more inﬂuence in a
lagged regression.
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(a) ﬁg 1 (b) ﬁg 2
Figure 7: Proportion of Granger causality 1 to 5 lags, 18 series of 40 observa-
tions, time axis shows last year of series, all variables
(a) ﬁg 1 (b) ﬁg 2
Figure 8: Proportion of Granger causality 1 to 5 lags, 18 series of 40 observa-
tions, time axis shows last year of series, only bank net income vs macroeconomic
variables
The increments of causality and feedback relations hold when considering
banking net income in pairwise relation to MV. A word of caution is pertinent
since this relation is not necessary to hold for the existence of transmission
eﬀects. The transmission network may operate with only one link (if the other
variables are connected), such as the relation of the second diﬀerence of M2 and
banking net income in ﬁgure 6.
This changing relations in the network of variables highlights the fact that
the study of emergent properties of the network structure should be relevant.
The interrelation of the variables give rise to diﬀerent network structures29 for
each time point as we can see from the examples of subsections 5.1 and 5.2 and
conﬁrm in ﬁgures 7 and 8. Each conﬁguration of the variables network may
give rise to diﬀerent output results, diﬀerent dynamic evolution for individual
variables and group of variables.
This changing nature of relations need also be considered for forecasting.
The structure of the network determines the value of the dependent variable
as the value of the individual independent variable do. A variable that is free
from the Lucas critique (and do not change it parameter) can be inﬂuenced
by another variable that is aﬀected by the critique. Suppose that dgnpdt, is
29Structure determined by: existence of connections (in the sense that one variable cause
other), when connected if there are feedback or one way, time persistence of connections and
presence of indirect connections.
14
free from the Lucas critique30. But uratea is not and cause dgnpdt31 as seen
in subsection 5.1; as a result the system of independent variables is subject to
the Lucas critique. This fact may be diﬃcult to grasp if dgnpdt remains in a
regression with reduced quantity of explanatory variables and uratea not32.
6 Concluding remarks
We have explored the relations between banking net income and MV using US
data with standard tools. Employing a linear regression we could not reject
the presence of multicollinearity in section 4. This was a strong indication that
the variables have relevant relations between them. To have a more exhaustive
insight we performed a Granger causality study in section 5. Given the presence
of structural breaks we also performed the analysis with a rolling windows ap-
proach which lead us to not reject a changing relationship between the variables
and to have indications of an augmented causal and feedback relation near the
2008 crisis in subsection 5.3.
M
ac
ro
lev
el
Bank Institutuion level
UR
Tbill
pi
DGNP
DDM2
Spread
Dnet
Oth
Figure 9: Network of variables
Let us recapitulate what the consequences of increased causality and feed-
back relations imply. A central argument of this paper is that the augmented
interrelation between variables generates a network of (often mutual) inﬂuences.
When all variables are interrelated, all inﬂuence each other (maybe indirectly
through other variables). This eﬀect makes diﬃcult to separate linear eﬀects
of one variable on the system33 of other variable movements (because those re-
lations are permanently changing). The longer the memory of a variable, the
greater the capacity to exercise as bridge of indirect causation (because it retains
and caries on the action of other variables that have inﬂuenced it).
30One argument to support the idea can be that the trend observed for dgnp represent
inﬂuence of economic policies, once detrended the variable may be free of policy inﬂuence.
31For concrete periods of causation see A tables 4,5,6,7.
32By the argument that dgnpdt has a signiﬁcant parameter and uratea not in the WHC
regression of subsection 3.
33Or on other variable.
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We can report that a substantial feedback relation at ﬁve percent signiﬁcance
level exist between ddm2 and dnetincome, and this may be the only channel
needed to canalize inﬂuence of the MV.
As we see34 in ﬁgure 9 when the system of MV is connected, then one link
to bank institution level suﬃces to expose banks income to all the consequences
of dynamic linked MV.
The interconnection between MV and banking income is a well-established
standard theory and almost trivial for most economist (Foglia et al., 2011); but
some aspects of this interrelation may provide necessary and useful information
for the understanding of the connections as seen in subsection 5.2.
First, the time persistence-duration of the connection between net banking
income and the MV is relevant to see the possibility of transmissions. Second,
the quantity variation of Granger causal connections at each point of time has
systemic eﬀects35. Third, understanding the emergent properties of the partic-
ular network has consequences for its development that can not be captured
studying the variables individually or looking at the aggregate consequences of
its interactions. Fourth, for forecasting, the trajectories of the relations of the
variables are also needed to take in account. If a great proportion of variables
are having feedback relations at the same time (or near the same time) the
outcome of the dependent variable may be very diﬀerent (see the increment of
Granger causal relations near 2008) of those when these relations are absent. In
terms of practical consequences this may imply a necessity for more simulated
dynamic paths for the system that take diﬀerent network structures in account.
An implication of this study is that theories that relies on only a reduced
vector of variables may be incomplete, and in crisis situation probably wrong.
In section 4 we have set out some relations that relates variables to certain
risks. For example, unemployment to credit risk or spreads to market risks.
The interactions of variables is a hint that those risks may be also correlated
and the variables may inﬂuence banking net income not only via one type of risk
but via the two mentioned in section 4. And second round eﬀect may be also
relevant enough as stated in subsection 4.3 and proved statistically in section
536. The study of interactions of variables is a promising subject and may build
bridges between theoretical postures.
34Where pi represents inﬂation, Tbill the three months T-bill interest rate, UR the unemploy-
ment rate, DGNP Gross National Product, DDM2 the second diﬀerence of money quantity,
Spread represent the spread between a Treasury and a Corporate Bond, Dnet is banking net
income and Oth are other variables that inﬂuence banking net income at sector and institu-
tion level. Lines represent feedback connections. Figure 9 shows a possible conﬁguration of
connections.
35Especially the increase of these connections during the last crisis may have systemic
consequences.
36Lower acceleration of money quantity may lead to lower banking net income, lower banking
income to lower acceleration of money quantity and so fort: with the possible transmission
eﬀects discussed at length in section 5 and especially in subsection 5.1.
16
A Granger causality tables
In the following tables periods are indicated with dashes and separated with
commas, years are identiﬁed by it last two numbers. Table 4 shows Granger
causal relations considering entire series for diﬀerent lags. Lag refers to the
included in the Granger causality test. The letter n indicates absence in tables
5 and 6.
Given the presence of a structural break we used a rolling windows approach
to see the evolution of Granger causal relations. Taking sub-samples of diﬀerent
size j beginning with date n (1961 in our case for all tests) for each variable par
and performing the test for the ﬁrst j and later beginning at n+1, n+2 and so
on maintaining ﬁxed size j until the last data point is included (year 2017 in our
case). We use size j= 10, 12, 15, for one lag; 20, 22, 25 for two lags; 30, 32 for
three lags, 38 for four lags, 45 and 47 for ﬁve lags. Size 40 is used for all lags.
For example, when j= 10 then the ﬁrst sub-sample takes from 1961 to 1970 and
the second from 1962 to 1971.
Table 5 displays unilateral Granger causality relations, whereas table 6
presents Granger feedback causality relations. Table 7 give the proportion of
years when causal relation exists (both unilateral and feedback). In all this
tables we can distinguish various regime-types. Those who have (almost) no
Granger causal relation at all such as uretea causing dgnpdt, those who have
sometimes these relations (more commonly with few lags) such as inflarss and
baa10my (both ways), those who's relation is persistent, dgnpdt with dnetincome
(both ways), and those who are (almost) always connected such as ddm2 with
dnentincome (both ways).
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